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Abstract
Displaced persons are relevant actors in determining not
only some of their life options but also some of the final re-
sults of violent conflict and policies addressing such con-
flict. Patterns of relocation and return are a key part of
those results, especially ethnic-related conflicts. An intro-
ductory model to the micro foundations of return (and re-
location) is presented here. This model is intended to
provide tools for a better understanding of the way vio-
lence affects individuals, and more concretely of the way
individuals react and cope with it. Particular emphasis is
given here to the role played by security concerns (originat-
ing in the conflict) in the decision-making process.
Résumé
Les personnes déplacées devraient être considérées comme
‘acteurs qualifiés’ pour décider non seulement de certains
des choix qui s’offrent à elles dans la vie, mais également
lorsqu’il s’agit de certains résultats finaux découlant des
conflits violents et des politiques en matière de gestion des
conflits. Les courants et tendances en matière de réinstal-
lation et de retour représentent un élément essentiel de
tels résultats eu égard à beaucoup de conflits contempo-
rains, plus particulièrement les conflits d’ordre ethniques.
Un modèle préliminaire sur les micro-fondements du re-
tour (et de la réinstallation) est proposé ici, dans le but
de fournir des outils pour une meilleure compréhension
des effets de la violence sur les individus, et plus concrète-
ment la manière dont les individus y réagissent et y font
face. L’emphase est particulièrement mise sur le rôle que
jouent les préoccupations liées à la sécurité (ayant leurs
origines dans le conflit) dans le processus décisionnel.
Introduction
When talking about refugees and persons who are displaced
as a result of violent conflict, we are implying a double
disruption in people’s lives. On the one hand, violence has
erupted into their lives and it has become a major force
shaping them. On the other hand, they have been forced to
leave their homes, which in many cases means they are no
longer able to lead the kind of life they led before.
Refugees1 have had their lives affected in a most dramatic
way by “politics by other means.”2 And they continue to
have it, as long as their available life options continue to be
conditioned by the scenarios of conflict settlement and
resolution, the actual peacekeeping, peacemaking, and
peacebuilding  strategies  and  interventions, the available
humanitarian assistance and the international and local
refugee regimes.
Having this in mind should lead to a profound reflection
about  the hierarchy of concerns present in the policies
addressing “politics by other means.” Are the rights and
lives of over 30 million persons the primary concern?3 Do
questions  of political interests, political pragmatism, or
political idealism come first? Must they?
Apart from such reflections, the recognition of refugees as
persons whose life options have been overwhelmed by politi-
cal designs and developments should also draw attention to
the way these persons not only are affected by these develop-
ments, but also to the way they react to them and cope with
their situation. In doing so, they become (and should be
considered) relevant actors in determining not only some of
their life options, but also some of the final results of “politics
by other means” and policies addressing them. It is relevant,
then, not only from a humanitarian point of view, to inter-
rogate ourselves about the way violence (and the threat of
violence) impacts individuals and groups. And, more specifi-
cally, to interrogate ourselves about the way individuals and
groups cope with it and react to it.
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Looking at Return from the Micro Level
There is no doubt that the relocation process unchained by
the conflict is the one aspect in which refugees are probably
most conditioned and limited by the both policies and “poli-
tics by other means. Not only because of the original forced
movement, but also regarding where and how they (may) end
up, either temporarily or on a more permanent basis. Free-
dom of movement is usually hampered for most refugees and
displaced persons, either in a formalized way or in an effective
way, subject to different asylum regimes, refugee centres’
regulations, rampant insecurity, or a stark lack of resources
and livelihood alternatives as a result of war and displace-
ment.4 Obviously, policies and “politics by other means” have
a major say as well in preventing, facilitating, or pushing the
reversal of the original move. However, not all the variation
found in the patterns of return and relocation can be ex-
plained through such macro factors. Otherwise it would be
hard to explain the variable rates and patterns of return
between locations most similar in their background and
structural features, such as the municipalities of Zvornik and
Vlasenica in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance.5 In order to
understand what is involved in such a process, we need to
look at the micro level and understand the social processes
and mechanisms unchained by political violence.
Micro Foundations for Return
We tend to assume the return to the place of origin, from
which people were forced to leave, as a natural move. And
there are sound reasons for this.6 Firstly, there are the ille-
gitimacy of the reason that pushed the fleeing, the brutality
and violation of human rights involved, and the injustices
generated in the process.7 The restoration of the situation,
reversing what was done, is therefore perceived as a matter
of justice and rightness. Secondly, it may be assumed that
when fleeing, the  individual  was forced  to leave behind
assets, investments, and livelihood in which her welfare was
sustained, including house, land, and businesses. For many,
the repossession of such assets and investments may remain
crucial, given that the scenario of displacement is often a
scenario of impoverishment and helplessness.8 And in many
cases the repossession makes no economic sense if not mov-
ing back (e.g. given difficulties of selling the property and
getting an appropriate revenue from it). Lastly, but not less
importantly, it remains the recognition of a deep intimate
and unique connection with the place of origin, that is, with
the place which is considered to be “home.”
However, the case is more complex than that, and all the
latter assumptions must be carefully considered. Regarding
the restoration or the reversal of the wrong done, the case
is often not as simple as “moving back.” Both the current
situation and also the original one may be far from ideal,
and moving back may do little (or even work contrary) to
the interest of justice and restoration of rightness.9 The
movement of return may not be a solution by itself to those
issues.
Also, the case of assets and investments is not clear, as
they may not exist or may not be relevant enough. They may
also have been destroyed or taken away. Or there may be
too many obstacles in the way to repossess them (and/or to
exploit them), such as  property issues, widespread  dis-
crimination, overcharges in taxes or fees, etc. Furthermore,
the individual may have developed opportunities, obtained
assets, or realized investments when in displacement. The
very scenario of displacement may be relatively more ad-
vantageous in terms of economic and welfare opportunities.
Finally, the utter strength of the link between the dis-
placed person and her place of origin should also be con-
sidered more carefully. In the first place, such a connection
may have not existed (as ideally imagined) to begin with,10
apart from the individual cases of those who for  some
reason disliked or repudiated their particular places, or just
felt unhappy or uprooted there,11 as well as those who did
not have clear roots or did have multiple ones (i.e. because
of changing places during childhood and/or adulthood).
This can amount also to a cultural or collective issue, as
showed in in-depth field research conducted in the Horn
of Africa.12 Such research revealed that these peoples, with
a history of displacement and geographical mobility, did
not perceive themselves as bound to a particular place.
Cases are not uncommon either in which violent conflict
itself and the transformations of the place of origin have
estranged it from the individual: “How can it be assumed
that refugees are returning ‘home’ when the very reason
they left were that they did not feel ‘at home’ anymore? […]
This is particularly true in the context of civil wars, ethnic
and religious conflicts.”13 There are many cases in which
displaced persons have “no reason to return” and they do
not return even when security concerns no longer exist.14
Furthermore, the individual may have developed new con-
nections during displacement with the place and the people
there15 that might compete with the old ones, especially if
the latter were weak or have been severed, as just men-
tioned. This could be expected especially in the case of
long-term displacements, mostly in those cases with a
highly entrenched conflict (thus leaving few expectations
for return and pushing people into a new direction due to
the virtual elimination of such possibility).16 And also for
those living under the most normalized circumstances in-
stead of being circumscribed, for instance, to a highly re-
strictive environment, as it is the case in many refugee
camps and collective centres or under certain asylum re-
gimes.17
Volume 25 Refuge Number 1
28
The End of Violence
There is furthermore one more crucial issue that renders
return a complex, far from straightforward, option. And that
is the very same reason why people left in the first place: the
risk assumed by being there. Obviously, the case is clear-cut
when the violence is still going on, but it applies to other cases
as well. Even when peace may appear stable (for instance,
after the signing of a peace agreement, after the deployment
of peacekeeping troops or after the occurrence of a disarma-
ment process18), still there are chances in most scenarios that
instability may regain momentum and violence may recur.19
In general, even for experts, it is hard to assess and assert the
end of  violence in a  definite way.20 Thus, it is not only
violence, but the threat of violence and the shadow that sheds
over people which matters. As a matter of fact, there is always
room for thinking that, if not in the short term, violence can
eventually resume in the middle or longer term. The consid-
eration of such a risk seems the more compelling since we are
dealing with people who have undergone the experience of
violence. Given such experience we could expect that credi-
bility of peace as a dominant situation in the state of the world
and credibility of commitments to peace by other actors have
been severed. Indeed, if these people fled, it was because the
bond of trust between them and their place of origin was
broken at a certain point.21 What matters the most in this case
is the individual’s perception of such threat.
The intriguing and complex nature of return (in terms
of security) can be best observed through the lenses of
rational choice. It is difficult to question the rationality of
the decision to flee in order to secure one’s survival and
physical integrity.22 The decision to return is precisely the
one that does not look so rational a priori. For a better grasp
of this idea, it is useful to assume  the  most simplified
scenario possible, where the individual has fled an unsafe
area and has reached a safe one.23 If this is the case, there is
no benefit to be expected (in terms of security) from mov-
ing back. This is even the case when the threat has been also
removed in the place of origin, as there is no relative advan-
tage to be derived from it.
Ongoing Research Project
The four elements mentioned so far as the pillars for the
assessment and understanding of return (and no return),
namely, justice, welfare, roots, and security, are part of a
doctoral research project currently being undertaken in Bos-
nia-Herzegovina.24 While considering the importance and
relevant roles of all of them, my personal and academic
interests lay specifically in the latter two: firstly, the extended
shadow left by violence in the form of continued threat, the
perception of such threat and the concern about it; and not
less importantly, the analysis and understanding of the con-
nection with the place considered “home” (what might be
called “pulling effect of the home origin”),25 and the way
such a connection is affected by the strain of violence. =I will
devote  the remaining part of  this  article to the security
component.
The research question trying to be answered is, put sim-
ply: why do individuals move back after being displaced be-
cause of a serious threat of violence? First of all, why do
some persons (under similar conditions) return and others
do not? But secondly, and most interestingly, as following
the security puzzle: why do the former return at all, given
that they are displaced within a safe area in which their
security is  not under strain, as it  was  in  their  place  of
origin?26 Why (and under what conditions) do individuals
who have demonstrated their aversion to the threat of
violence take the step of coming back?
The Security Component
As already noted, threat is a matter of perception (belief), as
well as a matter of analysis. And as such it is a cornerstone
issue for return. However, little is known of the way threat
is evaluated and incorporated into the decision-making
process. Two basic considerations must be taken into ac-
count: the fact that displaced persons have already been
subject to a serious threat of violence (if not to serious
violence itself), and the circumstance that they are away
from the scenario which is being evaluated.27 The questions
following this proposal are two: firstly, how do persons who
have experienced the effects of violence measure and per-
ceive the current and future threat of similar violence (with-
out even being present in the actual scenario)? And secondly,
how does it affect the decision of return?
1. Perception and Measurement of the Threat
There are three key elements to take into account. The first
obvious element is the actual threat. The nature and shape
of the threat (that is, the nature of conflict and the shape of
violence) logically determine the way in which it is to be
evaluated: what factors are to be considered, whether it is
more or less feasible to monitor them, etc.28 The second
element is imperfect information, which is the more accen-
tuated having taken into account the distance between the
person and the object of evaluation. In most cases such
evaluation will be highly mediated by different sources of
information, which may introduce further biases. The third
element is emotions, with special attention given to fear.
The perceived threat will likely emphasize some aspects
of the “objective scenario” over others; it may also neglect
some or clearly depart from others. Those aspects that differ
clearly and most regularly are likely to be the result of
imperfect information and of the intervention of emotions.
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The following categorization of the different kinds of
(real) possible threats has been derived from the empirical
observation of the universe of cases producing or maintain-
ing IDPs during the year 2002.
The sources of threat causing displacement (and being
evaluated upon return) have been categorized as follows:
A. Foreign political-military force (i.e. border conflict). In-
dividuals fled conventional “interstate” warfare (between
armies) affecting civilians. The situation may remain unsta-
ble or the foreign power may be in control of the area. The
threat may include communal violence.
B. Crossfire between Government Troops and Armed Groups
(i.e. factions, rebel groups). Individuals fled generalized
Real threat * imperfect information * emotions = perceived threat
Figure 1. Perceived Threat
Table 1. Nature of the threat
(in conflicts generating or maintaining IDPs in 2002)
Features proposed as having implications for the evaluation of the threat
SOURCE
Foreign
Power
Armed
Groups
Gov. and
armed
groups
Gov. and armed groups
in separatist/
minority area
Communal
Violence
NATURE OF
THE SOURCE
Organised actors Dispersed
TARGET† Not civilians,
still affected
Civilians targetted Ascriptive groups targetted
Eritrea-Ethiopia
Armenia-Azerbaijan
Cyprus
Israel
Lebanon
Syria (Golan Heights)
Algeria
Angola
DRCongo*
Liberia
SLeone
G-Bissau
Colombia
Peru
Philippines**
Ethnicity underlying
Burundi
RCongo
Sudan
Guatemala
Mexico
Afghanistan
Serbia South
Macedonia
G-Conakry
Uganda (east)
Iraqi Kurdistan
Ethnicity underlying
Uganda (north, west)
Rwanda
Somalia
Homogeneous area
Burma
Sri Lanka
Turkish Kurdistan
Majority group in a
mixed area
SenegalCasamance
Bangladesh CHT
India Kashmir
Indonesia Aceh
Georgia Abkhazia
Russia Chechnya
Moldova
Transdniestrian
Minority group in a
mixed area
SenegalCasamance
Bangladesh CHT
India Kashmir
Indonesia Aceh
Georgia Abkhazia
Russia Chechnya
Moldova
Transdniestrian
Kenya
Nigeria
India (Gujarati)
Indonesia (Malukus,
Kalimatan)
Solomon Islands
Georgia (Ossetia)
Russia (Ossetia)
Armed groups
significant
India (north-east)
Indonesia (Sulawesi)
Bosnia
Croatia
Serbia (Kosovo)
† Matching between source and target categories corresponds to the empirical observations of the cases considered. No necessary or
exhaustive connections are implied here.
*Also displacement for ethnic-violence
**Also separatist component
Sources: Global IDP Project, World Refugee Survey, International Crisis Group
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violence targeting all civilians in the country or region. The
threat arises from each of the sides (also the government).
(2) with ethnic cleavages underlying. They fled general-
ised violence targeting all civilians, but the threat of
violence increases (to varying degrees) with ethnic as-
cription.
C. Fire from Armed Groups. They fled violence targeting all
civilians. The threat arises from armed groups acting
against the government and/or the population, or fighting
each other (i.e. government is weak or non-existent).
(2) with ethnic cleavages underlying. They fled violence
trapping/targeting all civilians, but the threat of violence
increases (to varying degrees) with ethnic ascription.
D. Crossfire between Government Troops and Armed Groups
in Separatist/Minority Areas.
(1) Homogenous area. They fled violence targeting
their ethnic group by the government, and more gener-
ally violence trapping all civilians (also by the armed
groups).
(2) Majority in the area. They fled violence targeting
their ethnic group by the government, and more gener-
ally violence trapping all civilians (also by armed
groups). It may include communal violence from the
minority group in the area.
(3) Minority in the area. They fled violence targeting
their ethnic group by armed groups, and it may in-
clude communal violence.
E. Communal Violence. They fled violence targeting their
ethnic group. The threat arises from members of different
ethnic groups. The threat usually includes armed groups.
The evaluation (and hence the perception) of the threat
is a function of the different factors implied in the nature
of threat. If we understand the perception of the threat as
the perceived odds of being hit by violence,29 the components
of that calculation in each case are likely to be the following:
A. Foreign political-military force (border conflict).
F (intensity conflict + communal violence)
B. Crossfire between government troops and armed groups
(factions, rebel groups).
F (intensity conflict + intensity abuses government*
personal saliency30
+ intensity abuses armed groups*personal saliency)
(2) with ethnic cleavages underlying
F (intensity conflict + intensity abuses government*
ethnic ascription*p.saliency + intensity abuses armed
groups*ethnic ascription*p.saliency)
C. Fire from armed groups
F (intensity abuses armed groups*personal saliency)
(2) with ethnic cleavages underlying.
F (intensity abuses armed groups*ethnic ascription*per-
sonal saliency)
D. Crossfire between government troops and armed groups
in separatist/minority areas.
(1) Homogenous area.
F (intensity conflict + intensity abuses government *per-
sonal saliency
+ intensity abuses armed group*personal saliency)
(2) Majority in the area.
F (intensity conflict + intensity abuses government *per-
sonal saliency
+ intensity abuses armed group*personal saliency
+ communal violence)
(3) Minority in the area.
F (intensity conflict + intensity abuses armed group*per-
sonal saliency
+ communal violence)
E. Communal violence.
F (communal violence + intensity abuse armed
groups*personal saliency)
Naturally,  other factors affecting security assessment,
though not that dependent on the particularities of the
threat, are missing in this analysis and should be taken into
account.31
Each kind of threat and each factor within it can be
broken down and conceptualized in a systematic manner,
and subsequently translated into indicators adequate for
each country and conflict. The appraisal of all these factors
by the individual, nonetheless, will, it is expected, be medi-
ated by the intervention of emotions and the absence of
perfect information. Such mechanisms must be detailed
and introduced in the model as well.
For instance, in all the cases, except those of communal
violence, the threat arises from concrete (organized) actors.
The removal of such source of threat is relatively easy to
identify through the defeat, disappearance, or agreement of
the actors in conflict, and relatively easy to assess and
monitor (whether it is present in the area or not, its relative
strength, etc.).32 The sides of the conflict may either have
disappeared: rebels may have been annihilated or jailed, or
they may have fled, governments may be deposed. Or they
may be diluted in the post-conflict society: rebels may be
disarmed or reintegrated,33 and governments may undergo
reforms and political agreements.34 Even when these actors,
which were the source of the threat, remain (more or less
diluted) in the society, their direct position as a source of
threat is put somewhat under strain, as some organizational
or political developments should be expected for them to
resume such position.
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On the contrary, in cases of communal violence, where
the threat arises from ethnic ascription, the source of the
threat is dispersed. It is difficult to identify and to monitor,
what means that mistrust and fear are generally extended
to a complete category of individuals, whether it is person-
ally reasonable or not. The specific ways in which individu-
als measure and assess such a threat remain intriguing and
deserve special attention. The main mechanisms I propose
for the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina are based on the percep-
tion of the distribution of hard-liners in the area of return
and the amount of resources (including political ones) that
they command, as well as on the numbers and charac-
teristics of returnees in the area (safety in numbers argu-
ment) and the actual occurrence of episodes of violence.
The perception of all these factors is mediated, on the one
hand, by the information (and opinions) provided by social
contacts from the place of origin (both earlier returnees and
other displaced people visiting the area or discussing the
issue). And their perception is mediated as well, on the
other hand, by the presence of different emotions, with a
special relevance given to fear. Emotions are incorporated
into the model as an exogenous input consisting of a spe-
cific kind of information (i.e. they provide the individual
with information about her preferences and her relation to
the world and its changing stimuli).35
2. Incorporation of the Threat into Decision Making
My claim is that all factors and mechanisms related to the
security component are enabling factors of the decision to
return. They do not constitute explaining factors of return.
As already noted, once the individual is in a safe area, the
removal of the threat is not a motive to return per se, as it
does not provide any comparative advantage. It only con-
stitutes the removal of the main impediment to move back.
What must explain return are pulling factors in the home
origin  (and pushing  factors  in displacement), which  in
some cases are strong enough as to overcome the persist-
ence of threat, or the existence of other pulling factors in
displacement. I already mentioned the three main factors:
justice, welfare, and roots.
Figure 2 offers a graphic summary of the components of
the decision to return. There are factors related to justice,
welfare, and roots that tie to the place of origin, but there
may be others as well, in all the three dimensions, working
just on the contrary direction. The same happens with the
location of displacement. The consideration of all these
factors is conditioned, however, to the barrier of insecurity
to be broken. This remains a matter of grade, given that the
assessment of violence (and future violence) is somehow
elusive. The minimum level of security that is required in
order to pass that barrier will depend on the relative
strength of the pulling effect of the home origin, as well as
the factors pushing to abandon displacement.
“Happy dilemmas” are the very rare cases in which the
pulling factors dominate for both return and relocation.
These are people who have found a new promising life in
displacement, but still have plenty of reasons (and emo-
tional drive) for longing for  their home  origin. Much
more common, unfortunately, are the cases where the
pushing factors dominate, that is, where people seem to
have no place to stay and no place to go back to. Elderly
people are the ones usually having both arrows pointing
to return: they cannot adapt that easily or find a place for
themselves in the new reality, and they have a whole life
of investments  (both  material and emotional) back in
their place of origin. Youngsters tend to present just the
contrary case, especially when they have moved from a
rural to an urban area.
Notes
1. I will use interchangeably the terms “refugees” and “displaced
persons” and  I will be referring to the whole category of
persons who have been forced out of their homes because of a
violent conflict, no matter whether they have crossed an inter-
national border or not, or whether they fit into the Convention
definition.
2. This is Clausewitz’s well-known definition of war. Karl von
Clausewitz, On War (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1873).
3. UNHCR recognizes 12.7 million refugees under the Conven-
tion definition (including Palestinian numbers) and around
1.2 million asylum seekers and other persons of concern (not
counting stateless persons); see 2005 Global Refugee Trends.
The Global IDP Project of the Norwegian Refugee Council
estimates 23.7 millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs);
see the latest data and statistics in http://www.IDPProject.org.
The World Refugee Survey 2006 of the US Committee for
Refugees and Immigrants records 12 million refugees and 21
million internally displaced people. the survey is available at
<http://www.refugees.org>.
Figure 2. Enabling Factors and Explaining Factors
of Return (and No Return)
Volume 25 Refuge Number 1
32
4. In the year 2005 there were 7.89 million refugees who had been
already warehoused for five years or more. US Committee for
Refugees and Immigrants, World Refugee Survey 2006,
<http://www.refugees.org/data/wrs/06/docs/key_statistics.pdf>
(accessed September 30, 2006).
5. Located in the eastern part of the Republic of Srpska,  in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, both of them were Muslim-majority ar-
eas (above 50 per cent of the population) before the war, with
very similar social and economic structures. Both suffered a
fierce campaign during 1992 and remained under Serb control
until the end of the war. Both municipalities received a massive
influx of Serb refugees and both have been dominated after the
war by hard-line nationalists. However, Zvornik has registered
some of the earliest movements of minority returns (1996) and
the highest rates of total returns in the whole country.
Vlasenica, on the other hand, has been the last municipality
opening the process of return (2000) and it has registered the
lowest rates of total minority returns so far. These data have
been gathered  and  confirmed through the fieldwork con-
ducted in the last year in the region and they form part of my
forthcoming doctoral dissertation project. For the absolute
numbers of minority returns in each municipality, see
UNHCR, Map Total Minority Returns, available at <http://
www.unhcr.ba/return/pdf%202006/SP_07_2006.pdf> (ac-
cessed April 9, 2008).
6. Since the 1980s, voluntary repatriation has been promoted by
governments and UN agencies as the desirable and ultimate
solution to refugees. However it seems clear that strategic
considerations are likely to be behind such policy. See Tania
Ghanem, “When Forced Migrants Return ‘Home’: The Psy-
chosocial Difficulties Returnees Encounter in the Reintegra-
tion Process,” (RSC Working Paper No. 16, Refugee Studies
Centre, University of Oxford, 2003).
7. “Not only do most African refugees perceive their involuntary
displacement as temporary but also return is considered as a
great success. Return to the place one has been violently up-
rooted from is an overriding preoccupation, bordering obses-
sion, of most refugee populations in Africa. This is not only
true in Africa.”  Gaim  Kibreab,  “Revisiting the  Debate on
People, Place, Identity and Displacement,” Journal of Refugee
Studies 12 (1999): 384–410.
8. See for instance Awa M. Abdi, “In Limbo: Dependency, Inse-
curity, and Identity amongst Somali Refugees in Dadaab
Camps,” Refuge 22, no. 2 (2005): 6–14.
9. For instance, in many places in Bosnia-Herzegovina the sce-
nario of return is not a welcoming one. This is so because of
episodes of harassment, which were frequent and often life-
threatening at the beginning of the process, generalized dis-
crimination, and lack of infrastructure in many of the return
areas. In such a situation, it turns out that the ones returning
are often the least advantaged, who return as a result of lack of
alternatives. And they are left facing a situation of marginali-
zation and mistreatment.
10. Madawi Al-Rasheed, “The Myth of Return: Iraqi Arab and
Assyrian Refugees in London,” Journal of Refugee Studies 7, no.
2–3 (1999):199–219.
11. Ghanem.
12. UNRISD symposia, quoted in Ghanem.
13. Íbid., 21–22.
14. See Global IDP Project, Internally Displaced People: A Global
Survey, (London: Earthscan, 2002).
15. For instance, by forming a family and upbringing the children
in the new context. See Ghanem.
16. There are cases, like the Palestinians, which clearly challenge
this hypothesis.
17. See Refuge 22, no.2 (2005).
18. For an analysis of the credibility and effectiveness of peace
agreements see William Long and Peter Brecke, War and
Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution
(Cambridge, MA: Massachussetts Institute of Technology
Press, 2003).
19. The defeat of one side or the signing of an effective peace
agreement may occur, but violence may be later resumed or
some other faction may take it up, as in the cases of Mindanao
(Philippines), or Burundi. Violence may be recurrent (espe-
cially in cases of communal violence as riots) or even cyclical,
as exemplified by conflict in the Republic of Congo (Brazza-
ville), in separatist Aceh (Indonesia), or Casamance (Senegal).
Some conflicts have a “chronic” character of generalized vio-
lence, as in Colombia. As in Angola, violence may decrease
during some periods or in specific areas without the conflict
and violence being ended or solved. There are cases in which
the ending of violence may be quite clear, but some more or
less sporadic violence may still occur, as in the cases of Bosnia,
Sri Lanka, or the Transdniestrian region in Moldova.
20. The huge literature on conflict management, conflict resolu-
tion, and early warning systems is testimony of that.
21. Ghanem.
22. Indeed, this is one of the most recurrent arguments by those
who defend the functionality and “covered” rationality of
emotions: fear makes you take the right decisions in the right
moment, normally fighting back or fleeing. See Antonio
Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human
Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994).
23. The assumption that the context of displacement is safe and
that security is not under strain (to the same extent and in the
same manner as it was in the place of origin) does not apply
in many cases, especially for internally displaced people or
people displaced into neighbouring countries, who often find
themselves in a situation of vulnerability and exposure. For
instance, IDP camps and “protected villages” have constituted
for years the most regular targets for the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA) attacks in Uganda’s Ruwenzori Mountains. See
Global IDP Survey 2002. In a recent document elaborated by
different international NGOs and incorporated into the World
Refugee Survey 2006, special attention is reclaimed for ware-
housed refugee women, denouncing a “myriad of human
rights violations against displaced women and girls during all
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stages of displacement,” including sexual exploitation and
involuntary recruitment into militia and armed forces, abduc-
tion and trafficking, as well as lack of access to humanitarian
assistance.
24. Many of the reflections, examples, and details presented in this
article are derived from that work and from the experience of
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
25. This means digging into the question of the sources of (deeply
rooted) local attachments, which are at the base of national-
isms, regionalisms, and localisms, and which lie at the heart of
the exile nostalgia and other like phenomena.
26. By “safe area” I understand an area where violence is not a
pervasive threat for the individual. As I already noted, this is
not usually the case. So  far,  I have  just focused on cases
fulfilling such a condition, simplifying the puzzle as much a
possible for clarity, with the number of factors intervening
kept as low as possible. However, research should continue in
this direction.
27. Though cases vary in the possibility, frequency, and intensity
of visits and stays in the area.
28. The nature of the threat will have major consequences for the
process of return,  not only in this regard, but also when
considering the kind of conflict they are linked to (either
warlords’ factions, communal ethnic violence, conventional
interstate warfare, etc.) and the kind of marks left upon society
(level and targets of destruction, number and characteristics
of human losses, etc.).
29. This implies a certain homogenization of violence, as far as
aversion to violence is concerned.
30. This should be defined by the usual and logical targets of the
source of violence. The characteristics which may raise the
saliency of individuals as a target range from social, profes-
sional, or ideological visibility (e.g. local leaders, journalists)
to personal characteristics which render them more vulnerable
or more attractive as a target (e.g. women, children used as
soldiers, wealthy persons abducted).
31. Like the presence of landmines, the availability of an effective
exit option (i.e. distance to the border), the visibility of the
return area (i.e. remote rural areas), the presence of interna-
tional forces, and so.
32. For instance, in April 2000 Chechen fighters were reported to
have withdrawn from the lowlands to consolidate  in  the
mountains. Then, some return movements  occurred.  See
Global IDP Survey 2002. See also Long and Brecke for an
analysis of the credibility and effectiveness of peace agree-
ments.
33. Forty-five thousand former fighters  in Sierra Leone had
handed in their weapons by January 2002, marking a substan-
tial improvement in the security situation in the country. In
Angola, UNITA soldiers and their families congregated at
more than forty sites throughout the country in 2002 to disarm
and begin the process of demobilization. The government
army accepted 5,000 UNITA soldiers into its own ranks. Ob-
servers expressed concern that thousands of UNITA weapons
might remain hidden, but a general climate of optimism pre-
vailed (World Refugee Survey 2002).
34. As in Burundi (2001), Macedonia (2001),  or  Bangladesh
(1997).
35. See Damasio; Roger Petersen, Resistance and Rebellion (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Yaniv Hanoch,
“Emotions as a Mechanism for Boundedly Rational Agents,”
communication at the IV Winter Workshop on Economics and
Philosophy: Psychological Foundations of the Theory of Choice
in Economics (Madrid: UNED, 2003).
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